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I. INTRODUCTION
Are United States commercial institutions and free trade norms out
of step with its current international economic position? Since the close
of World War II the United States has been a staunch defender of free
trade. Its open trade policy encourages the elimination of barriers to the
free movement of goods across national boundaries, supports private
rather than state-owned or state-operated enterprise, and promotes mul-
tilateralism. This policy deviates sharply from the country's pre-war de-
fense of trade protectionism, and was preceded by a critical change in
institutional authority. In 1934 Congress relinquished direct control
over tariffs and granted to the executive branch and its more insulated
administrative bureaucracy the preponderance of authority over trade
matters.' In retrospect, though, it is clear that both executive autonomy
and liberal trade norms rested on United States economic and military
superiority. The United States could be committed to free trade for the
same reason that Mohammed Ali in his prime only needed a fair fight: no
one could touch them.
To be sure, United States support for the post-war liberal trade re-
gime was based on more than economic self-interest. An allied trading
bloc went hand-in-hand with the United States security strategy. Eco-
nomic gains throughout the alliance were expected from open trade.
Post-war domestic political stability in Europe and Japan was predicated
on a consensus favoring economic growth, not class conflict and political
dispute over scarce resources. That growth depended on commerce,
which would both ensure an expanding "pie" and entice the requisite
consumer spending.2 Today, neither the security interests of the United
States, nor the premise of economic gains from open trade, has changed
radically. Yet, the country's commitment to liberalism is under scrutiny,
and the reason is simple. In a range of critical economic sectors from
agriculture to microelectronics, United States producers are now facing
tough competition.
The debate surrounding recent trade legislation, the increasing
number and diversity of petitions for relief being filed under United
States trade laws since the late 1970s, and the highly visible trade
problems of United States automobile, steel, textile, and semiconductor
1 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-316, ch. 474, Stat. 943 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1201, 1351-54 (1982)). For a comprehensive survey of the current
trade laws, see HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, SUBCOMM. ON TRADE, OVERVIEW OF CUR-
RENT PROVISIONS OF U.S. TRADE LAWS, H.R. Doc. No. 40, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. (1984)[hereinafter
CURRENT PROVISIONS].
2 See generally Maier, The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Eco-
nomic Policy After World War 1I, 31 INT'L ORG. 607 (1977).
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producers, all attest to the diminishing competitive advantage of United
States industries.3 These factors have convinced most trade analysts that
the United States is on the road to protectionism.4
Hopes that pressures for protection would abate with the declining
exchange rate of the dollar have been dimmed by the surprising persis-
tence of massive trade deficits. After years of lackluster productivity
growth, plunging net domestic investment rates, and mounting public
and private consumption, United States dollars sent abroad to purchase
imports during a consuming frenzy have flowed back in the form of mas-
sive indebtedness to foreign lenders, totalling almost $400 billion by the
end of 1987.1
In the long run, debts must be paid off through export earnings.
When debt payment occurs, presumably the United States fervent faith
in free trade will be restored and the country's stroll toward protection
will be halted. Critical questions then emerge. At what declining ex-
change value of the dollar will the country's accounts start generating a
surplus? At what level of foregone consumption will the quality and
competitiveness of the country's products be revived? At what apprecia-
3 For testimony relating to this problem, see congressional hearings held during 1987 by the
Senate Finance, House Ways and Means, and Joint Economic Committees: Dual Pricing of Natural
Resources: Hearings on S. 1292 and S. 1356 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Employment, Productivity and Int'l Trade: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Remedies Against Dumping of Imports:
Hearings on S.1655 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Proposals to Reform the Escape Clause: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Possible New Round of Trade Negotiations: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); State Trading Enterprises: Hearings on S.
2660 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986); Trade Reform Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). For the number and diversity of trade petitions filed,
see the databases of the United States Trade Representative ("USTR") and the United States De-
partment of Commerce, as well as the 28th Annual Report of the President of the United States on
the Trade Agreements Program (1984-85).
4 See, e.g., M. KRAUSS, THE NEw PROTECTIONISM (1978). The numbers seem to support
these conclusions. In 1975, import tariff protection above GATT-negotiated levels, orderly market-
ing and voluntary export restraints, and quotas affected about 8% of United States merchandise
imports. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1987, at E5 (data developed by the Institute for International Eco-
nomics). By 1985, this figure had risen to about 22%. Id. However, this 1985 figure does not hold
general tariff levels constant, nor account for the reduction in overall tariffs due to the Tokyo Round
agreements. If considered, the computation for increases in the level of protection in 1985 would be
considerably less.
5 Productivity growth was 0.6% annually during the 1970s and only 0.4% during the 1980s;
net private domestic investment averaged 6.9% of GNP during the 1970s, and only 4.7% from 1980
to 1986. See Peterson, The Morning After, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 1987, at 43, 44; see also Ray,
Changing Patterns of Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriers, 8 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 285, 293-95 (1987)(illustrating a link between declining economic statistics and
rising levels of protectionism in the United States).
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bly lowered standard of living will the country's foreign debt finally stop
expanding? These remain unanswered questions. Unanswered too is to
what extent and on what terms other economies will be able and willing
to absorb the products the United States must export in order to generate
the necessary earnings. One thing is certain: the domestic adjustments
necessary to balance the trade deficit will strain, and perhaps even under-
mine, United States social, economic, and political harmony. How well
the norms and institutions6 of United States trade policy will compre-
hend, adapt to, and help dissipate the enormous strains of adjustment
confronting the nation is the central question posed in this Article.
This Article argues that substantial changes in both international
trade norms and institutions are necessary if successful and coherent ad-
justment is to be accomplished. These changes have not yet begun.
Rather, the protectionist views of the liberal, free-trade consensus of the
early post-war years, and the free trade-enabling adjustment programs of
the Great Society all remain embedded norms in existing trade laws.
These three periods of United States history left a legacy of institutions
and ideas that frame all trade issues as a dichotomy of free trade versus
protection from unfair competition. The problem with this legacy is that
neither category is able to place in an appropriate context either the chal-
lenges confronting United States industry or the policy actions needed to
deal effectively with those challenges today.
The recent problems faced by the United States semiconductor in-
dustry best illustrate the limitations of current institutions and ideas. As
a high-tech growth industry nurtured by early United States defense and
6 Throughout this Article, a number of terms are used to clarify the process of trade legislation
and policy. Ideas are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude which frame a community's debate of
and response to a particular issue. See Goldstein, Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy, 42
INT'L ORG. 177, 180 n.6 (1986)[hereinafter Ideas); Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Conse-
quences, 36 INT'L ORG. 185, 186 (1982). Ideas about economic policy are combined with values or
beliefs on correct courses to comprise norms, or ideas with a normative character. More precisely,
norms may be defined as "standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations." Id.
This Article argues that norms are embedded in institutions in order to establish them as secure
solutions to an issue, and shelter the solutions from political forces which differ with the norms'
application to a future issue. An institution is a set of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and
ethical behavioral norms designed to constrain the behavior of individuals. D. NORTH, STRUCTURE
AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HIsTORY 201-02 (1981). Thus, ideas about economic phenomena, im-
bued with value, affect the form, function, and scope of economic institutions.
Ideas and norms exist not only within the institutions, however, but in society as well. Indeed,
the original norms embedded in institutions are derived from the society which originally established
the institutions in question. At any given time, therefore, the norms of society may be inconsistent
with the "earlier" norms embedded in existing institutions. See infra note 12 and accompanying
text; see also J. Goldstein, Crisis Politics: The Effects of Ideas and "Fortuna" on Political Institu-
tions (Sept. 1987)(paper presented at the 1987 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association)[hereinafter Crisis Politics].
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space policy, and until recently dominated by domestic producers, the
United States microchip industry should be a strong pillar supporting the
United States position in the world economy. Instead, the semiconduc-
tor industry is an industry fighting for its life. This Article argues that
United States trade policy has largely failed to understand and address
the industry's competitive plight.
This Article first explores the origins and evolution of existing trade
norms and institutions.7 Then, as an example of the pressures on and
potential responses open to United States industry, the Article turns to
the recent experiences of the United States semiconductor industry.8
The Article concludes with some thoughts on the future of trade poli-
cymaking institutions, including the insight that the failure in United
States trade policy has been in part due to the lack of ideas on how the
United States should respond to foreign competition in a burgeoning
world economy.9
II. LEGACIES FROM THE PAST
Despite the United States international economic difficulties, in the
short term the nation's general commitment to open trade is likely to
prove at least as persistent as its trade deficit. The explanation for this
apparent paradox lies in the organized political support for open trade,
the short-run unresponsiveness of government to demands for change in
existing norms and institutions, and the enduring ideological strength of
the idea of free trade.10
First, although the overwhelming consensus among United States
7 See infra notes 10-113 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 114-139 and accompanying text.
9 See infra sec. V, at 363-64.
10 This article takes one of two approaches which dominate the study of trade policy. The first,
associated with the field of international politics, argues that a nation's trade policy reflects its rela-
tive power position. The "power" of a nation depends on the relative size of the state and the
distribution of commercial power among trading partners. Variations in national endowments will
influence a nation's trading "power." Such power translates into differing commercial strategies.
See D. LAKE, POWER PROTECTION AND FREE TRADE: THE INTERNATIONAL SOURCES OF UNITED
STATES COMMERCIAL STRATEGY, 1887-1939 (forthcoming 1988); Keohane, The Theory of Hege-
monic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977 in CHANGE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 131 (0. Holsti, R. Siverson & A. George eds. 1980); Krasner, State Power
and the Structure ofInternational Trade, 28 WORLD POL. 317 (1976). This approach personifies
states as single rational actors with specific preferences, and is useful in defining the outer boundary
of permissible state action in trade. It does not, however, explain why states subject to the same
international constraints or having comparable amounts of power adopt vastly different trade poli-
cies.
The second approach-of which this Article is a subset-attempts to explain different reactions
of similarly situated states, by focusing on the domestic component of trade policy. This approach
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business during the early 1960s favoring open trade is no longer intact,
there are still a substantial number of industries that perceive their fu-
tures in access to global markets."1 These include: 1) most of the mul-
tinational insurance, banking, securities, and other financial services
sectors; 2) the electronics, chemicals, pharmaceutical, and energy indus-
tries; 3) agriculture; 4) aerospace; 5) the emerging United States produ-
cers of new materials and biotechnology; 6) the automobile industry; and
7) almost all United States multinational companies. Together, these and
other industrial players exert strong and vocal political pressure in favor
of maintaining the United States commitment to open trade.
Second, even where well-organized opposition to open trade exists,
the norms that have developed and the institutions which have been cre-
ated to implement the United States trade policy do not necessarily re-
spond to the opposition.12 Demands for trade relief are processed
through existing institutional channels and adjudicated according to es-
adopts an interest group or economistic perspective, and centers on the ability of groups to enact
state policies which favor their product over foreign competitors in home markets.
Two intellectual strains are intertwined in segments of this latter approach. The first, associated
with Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960), suggests that in the absence of
transaction costs, rational individuals will enter into exchanges necessary to reach efficient results,
regardless of the institutional context. State policy emerges as an equilibrium from the opposing
efforts of those who want a protectionist policy and those who represent interests in free trade. For a
review of the cost-of-protection literature, see Corden, The Costs and Consequences of Protection: A
Survey of Empirical Work, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE (P. Kenen ed. 1975); see also
Brock & Magee, Tariff Formation in a Democracy, in CURRENT ISSUES IN COMMERCIAL POLICY
AND DIPLOMACY 1 (J. Black & B. Hindley eds. 1980); Brock & Magee, The Economics of Special
Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff, 68 AM. EON. REv. 246 (1978).
The second intellectual tradition arises from the work of Mancor Olson. M. OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE GOODS (1965). Here, interests do not automatically translate into policy
outcomes since groups vary in their ability to organize effectively. Analysts within this genre have
focused on both the origins of demand and on the incorporation of social interests in public policy,
either through Congress, see R. BALDWIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. IMPORT POLICY 33-
77 (1985); R. BAUER, I. POOL & L. DEXTER, AMERICAN BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY (1972); E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLrrICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF (1935), or through the control of bu-
reaucratic agencies, see Baldwin, Rent-Seeking and Trade Policy: An Industry Approach, 120
WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHEs ARCHIV 662 (1984); Finger, Hall & Nelson, The Political Economy of
Administered Protection, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 452 (1982).
11 On the early 1960s consensus which these authors identify, see generally R. BAUER, I. POOL
& L. DEXTER, supra note 10.
12 Within the institutional genre, scholars are far from uniform in their appraisal of the sources
and longevity of institutional independence. Most argue that institutions may be independent in the
short run, but that they must ultimately respond to a set of underlying forces. Where they are seen
to be bound by international constraints, state institutions can be modelled as independent of domes-
tic social constituencies. Institutional development is then understood to be part of either a sociolog-
ical, macro-historical, or mystical process. See Shepsle, Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium
Institutions, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS 51, 66, 76 (H. Weisberg ed. 1986).
State institutions will vary in their ability to extract necessary resources from society with which to
compete in international politics, see Katzenstein, Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Poll-
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tablished norms. Both processes act to filter and contextualize interests.
Thus, the responsiveness of policy to changing social needs is con-
strained, and interest group pressures to change established policy may
be ignored.
Institutions arise from agreements among groups and individuals to
overcome some collective action problem, efficiently meet a social need,
or compromise among competing interests. Institutions are "sticky;"
over the structure and agenda of any institution looms the "deal" that
was originally struck to create it. Early agreements and compromises
made between parties which established the institution influence the in-
stitution's later policies. Thus, trade institutions themselves legitimate
certain claims for aid-their establishment laid down the "rules" under
which groups would vie for the benefits of protection. To be sure, these
rules reflect some societal values and interests, but they often do not re-
flect contemporary beliefs and interests.
One of the pillars of United States government, the separation of
powers, makes it extremely difficult to effect rapid change in institutional
structures.13 This institutional lag is not necessarily counterproductive.
If institutions are to be effective, those established to overcome some col-
lective action problem or concern must lack responsiveness to the indi-
vidual interests which suffer most from their creation. Institutions act as
a mechanism to foreclose cheating. Translated into trade policy terms,
Congress delegated power to the executive branch to set tariffs, partly to
protect the economy from the ill effects of log-rolled tariffs.14 The
change in thinking by members of the legislature was striking.
cies of Advanced Industrial States, 31 INT'L ORG. 587 (1977), but to survive, states ultimately must
respond to external changes in the international system.
The institutional analysis of other scholars, including that of Professor Goldstein, focuses on the
development of institutions in response to domestic constraints. Under this approach, institutions
reflect what Riker refers to as "congealed tastes." Riker, Implications from the Disequilbrium of
Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions, 74 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 432, 455 (1980). Institutions are a
constancy mechanism for social preferences that otherwise would not exist. The definitive work on
social preferences is that of Arrow, Statistics and Economic Policy, 25 ECONOMETRICA 523 (1957).
Institutions are mechanisms for inducing stability in unstable social systems. Institutions establish
rules which influence their future behavior and make certain outcomes or social deals more viable
than others. Social groups are then forced to act strategically based on the rules encased in these
institutions.
13 For example, an institution like the electoral college is able to continue though it enjoys little
domestic support. For further discussion of institutional "lags," see Krasner, Regimes and the Lim-
its of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables, 37 INT'L. ORG. 497, 501 (1982).
14 The abdication of tariff-making power by Congress in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
of 1934 was one of the more unusual events in congressional history. The fear that congressional
intervention would lead again to high tariffs, and possibly another Depression, motivated Congress
to transfer to the President its traditional prerogative. See E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 10, at
25 n.14, 149, 153; J. Goldstein & W. Lowry, Aggrandizement or Abdication: Congressional Delega-
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Third, "ideas" may survive far longer than the competing interests
which gave rise to the ideas in the first place. The development of insti-
tutional structures coincides with the development of a legitimating ide-
ology-a conception of causation or knowledge under which the
institution was established. The acceptability of an institution's decisions
depends on the legitimacy of its ideology and values to its constituents. 15
Analysis of institutions, then, requires a separate, but critical evaluation
of the norms which accompany those structures. These underlying val-
ues and ideas, either alone or in conjunction with institutions, influence
the direction and speed of policy change. For example, the value of gov-
ernment non-intervention in the area of trade comes from a generations-
old consensus. However, there is a dawning recognition that in many
international markets, active government promotion actually helps do-
mestic industries to compete and can leave the domestic economy better
off than if it were entrusted solely to the "invisible hand."16 This glim-
mer of recognition has not brought about a normative change in the insti-
tutional approach. The value of government non-intervention remains
embedded. An alternative trade paradigm does not yet exist for the
United States, and unless an adequately defined replacement emerges, the
ideological commitment to open trade will outlive the political support
which sustained it in the past. 17
Given the self-interested domestic political support for free trade, its
institutional embodiment in law and bureaucracy, and the enduring
power of the idea of free trade, it is not surprising that there is only one
ideology available today. This ideology frames the trade debate in terms
of free trade or unfair trade. Only if foreign practices fall into these cate-
gories do claims for protection become legitimate.
The unfortunate result of the dichotomy between free/fair trade and
unfair trade is that the problems of United States industries today con-
tions of Power (Sept. 1987)(paper presented at the 1987 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association).
15 Just as people adhere to contracts because they are considered "just," institutional decisions
and policies are accepted because they are seen as "fair." Without legitimacy of an institution's
underlying ideology and values, enforcement costs undermine all but self-enforcing relationships
between the institution and its constituents. See J. Goldstein, Crisis Politics, supra note 6.
16 See generally Krugman, Introduction: New Thinking About Trade Policy, in STRATEGIC
TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (P. Krugman ed. 1986).
17 At least two forces are acting to keep free trade policy intact. First, in the United States the
organization of government itself acts to slow policy change. Second, the separation of powers,
overlapping mandates, and bureaucracy all make policy reform slow and incremental. The policy
cannot change unless a viable alternative set of ideas and norms exists regarding how policy could
and should be reorganized. Thus, even if analysts agree that trade policy is in crisis, the general
slowness of institutional change and the lack of an alternative idea to liberalism precludes a radical
shift in United States commercial policy.
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front a stagnant set of legal and normative categories. These categories
uphold the idea of free trade rather than allow a dynamic approach with
the capacity to meet the actual needs of the industries. The institutional
norms of the past, reflected in current trade law and bureaucracy, have
an enduring impact on policy. 18 Thus, a contracting industry like steel, a
recovering industry like autos, and a growth industry like semiconduc-
tors all must fit their quite different problems into the same legal
categories.
III. THE GENEALOGY OF NORMS
Three intellectual traditions have influenced United States trade pol-
icy since the Civil War. The first period-the "mercantilist" era-begins
around the late nineteenth century and the United States entrance into
world commerce. In this period United States decisionmakers, answer-
ing to domestic interests, understood trade to be essentially a one way
street, where the United States would benefit from increasing demands
for domestic products but reciprocal penetration of the United States
market was not a concern. This period gave birth to a set of trade stat-
utes which attempted to combat unfair trade practices in other countries
for the benefit of United States producers. Congress was the most active
trade institution in this period, where constituent demands were an-
swered through higher tariffs and other forms of aid."9 During this time,
imports were not viewed as a source of cheap foreign goods, a "carrot"
for reciprocal lowering of other nations' trade barriers, or a financial
mechanism to allow debtor countries to earn dollars. Protectionism and
autarky were the dominant ideas of the day and were defended on
grounds ranging from the defense of infant industry to a fear that trade
would impoverish United States labor.
The second formative period for trade policy occurred in the 1930s
when neo-classical or liberal economic notions of trade came to dominate
ideas of protectionism. Association of the Smoot-Hawley tariffs2 ° with
the Great Depression led policymakers to conclude "that the U.S. could
no longer use tariffs to help non-competitive industries; the economic and
political ramifications of ignoring market forces were too great. Politi-
cally this meant that short-term political forces, in the form of powerful
18 This point is made by many practitioners, among them former United States Deputy Trade
Representative Alan Wolff. See Wolff, International Competitiveness ofAmerican Industry: The Role
of US. Trade Policy, in U.S. COMPETITIVENESS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (B. Scott and G. Lodge
eds. 1985).
19 See id. at 194-360; see also J. BARTON & B. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVEST-
MENT 94 n.9 (1986).
20 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
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and articulate industrial interests, could not dominate in trade mat-
ters.""1 This conclusion permitted two crucial conditions for fundamen-
tal policy change to occur, even though it has been shown that high
tariffs merely exacerbated existing structural problems in the world econ-
omy.2 2 First, protectionism was discredited as the intellectual basis for
trade policy.23 Second, institutional responsibility for the setting of tariff
levels was shifted from Congress to the executive branch24 and the adju-
dication of petitions for import relief was vested in the International
Trade Commission ("ITC").2 5
While the Great Depression in the United States had served to in-
validate protectionism, a coherent alternative was not immediately avail-
able. The lessons were initially more modest. Protection from market
forces would not automatically or politically be granted. Industries de-
manding aid would have to plead their cases through relatively more in-
dependent institutions and quasi-judicial procedures.26 Congressional
delegation of authority to dispense tariff protection assured a general
commitment to trade liberalism, while guaranteeing to New Deal indus-
tries continued rapid growth and competitive strength unfettered by the
complications of congressional, pork-barrel decisionmaking.27
Besides the mercantilist and liberal periods of United States trade
policy, a third era arose in the 1960s. Congress legislated a set of redis-
tributive "welfare" policies as a response to ailing United States indus-
tries which were suffering under the competitive pressures of
international markets. These redistributive measures became a necessary
part of the liberalization process, though intellectually they were not dif-
ferent from domestic programs associated with the New Deal and the
Great Society. Those that suffered economic dislocation due to the loss
21 Goldstein, The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REv.
161, 165 (1986)[hereinafter Institutions].
22 See C. KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION 1929-1939 305-06 (1973).
23 "Intellectual traditions take hold at moments when prevailing analysis is shown to be defi-
cient. As the political community searches for a new and, it is to be hoped, more successful ap-
proach, alternative theoretical frameworks are seriously examined and can be used to explain and
codify policy decisions." Goldstein, Institutions, supra note 21, at 164. After Smoot-Hawley, the
time was ripe for the institutionalization of a liberal trade norm as an alternate to the discredited
mercantile philosophy.
24 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 98-57, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (1934).
25 Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, ch. 497, § 337 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1337 (1982)).
26 This may have been the impetus for empowering the independent ITC to rule on the merits of
industrial claims for protection and the more autonomous President to set tariffs in line with the
national economic interest.
27 This mirrored congressional attempts to delegate in other areas, for instance in the regulatory
power area at issue in Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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of comparative advantage could receive compensation from an ever-ex-
panding economy. The idea was that liberalism brought prosperity to all
and that those who suffered from adjustment problems deserved some of
the wealth of the majority.
The welfare era of trade policy was immediately preceded by a
number of powerful industries beginning to feel the strains of foreign
trade. Elected leaders had to be responsive to their demands. Since pro-
tectionism fell outside the political agenda, the adjustment assistance re-
sponse was created. Programs which refinanced industry and paid off
laborers were inaugurated in the 1960s to keep liberalism alive.28
Though the redistributive policies contained the seeds of a policy alterna-
tive to the free trade-unfair trade dichotomy, trade adjustment policies
never fully developed as such.
In sum, today's policy landscape is composed of the norms and in-
stitutions from three distinct historical periods. The legislation devel-
oped in each of these periods will now be examined to show how differing
notions of protectionism co-exist in United States law.
A. Free Trade: Escape Clause Legislation
First instituted by Executive Order in 1947 and incorporated into
statute in 1951, the United States has always included "escape clauses"
in trade treaties and legislation29 in order to allow "the President to with-
draw or modify trade concessions and impose duties or other restrictions
on imports of any article which causes or threatens serious injury to the
domestic industry producing a like or directly competitive article, follow-
ing an investigation and determination by the International Trade Com-
mission."3 Initially, the escape clause was designed to accomplish what
the old "peril point" had failed to do, that is, to keep imports at a level
which precluded injury to domestic producers. 3' The concept of the es-
cape clause was first used as a provision in a 1942 trade agreement with
Mexico.32 The idea reappeared in the ongoing debate over the Trade
Agreements Act of 1945 as a compromise by the executive following con-
gressional transference of increased tariff-making authority.33 The result
28 See infra notes 95-113 and accompanying text.
29 Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 50-141, § 7(a), 65 Stat. 72 (1951);
Exec. Order No. 10,004, 3 C.F.R. 819 (1943-1948).
30 CURRENT PROVISIONS, supra note 1, at 62.
31 See generally S. METZGER, TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE KENNEDY ROUND 39-54
(1964)(discussing peril points and the escape clause as safeguards against injury).
32 Agreement Between the United States and Mexico Respecting Reciprocal Trade, Dec. 23,
1942, United States-Mexico, art. XI, 57 Stat. 845-46, E.A.S. No. 311 (terminated in 1950).
33 Trade Agreements Act of 1945, 59 Stat. 410 (1945). See Ris, "Escape Clause" Relief Under
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was Executive Order 9832,11 which established that all future trade
agreements were to include escape clause provisions.35
To assure congressional assent, the United States backed inclusion
of an escape clause provision similar to that in its domestic law, in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). 36 The provision,
Article XIX, was reputedly condemned by President Truman as "an em-
barrassment to be avoided in the interest of maintaining an image of
United States leadership and dependability in world and foreign af-
fairs."37 Once in place, however, the United States was the first to invoke
the escape provision four years later in a case involving hatter's fur.38
Prompted by the United States, the GATT Council held that the United
States was "entitled to the benefit of the doubt" in its estimation of crite-
ria of injury.39 This somewhat loose interpretation of Article XIX led to
the prediction that the liberal tenets of GATT would be defeated in an
onslaught of cases using a nation's own definition of injury as grounds for
protection. However, the use of Article XIX to escape liberalization by
the United States or any of its trading partners has been limited. The
magnitude of changes in trade patterns over the postwar period has not
been reflected in use of the article. In effect, unilateral and bilateral tac-
tics have substituted for the multilateral discipline of Article XIX.
Although the original intent of the escape clause procedure was fro-
zen into GATT rules, its domestic United States counterpart has evolved
over time." Much of the original program remains.41 A quick examina-
the Trade Act of 1974: New Standards, Same Results, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 297, 299 (1977);
see also Goldstein, Ideas, supra note 6.
34 3 C.F.R. 126 (1974).
35 See Ris, supra note 33, at 299.
36 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XIX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. There have been seven major rounds of tariff and trade
negotiations under the GATT. See Matsushita, A Japanese View of United States Trade Law, 8 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 29, 30-31 (1987).
37 See Ris, supra note 33, at 300.
38 See Hatter's Fur Case, TC Pub. 82, Inv. No. 7-115, TEA-I-3 (March 1963).
39 Id. GATT, supra note 36, arts. XXII, XXIII. For a discussion of the international dispute
settlement procedures under GATT, see J. BARTON & B. FISHER, supra note 19, at 453-54.
40 The current version of "§ 201" is found in the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 201,
88 Stat. 1978 (1975)(codified as amended by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C. § 2251
(1982 & Supp. 11 1985)). Escape clause procedures have been re-examined four times since the
original version was set forth in the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, ch. 141, §§ 6-7, 65
Stat. 72 (1951). See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text. Each re-examination saw varying
degrees of adjustment of the statute's procedures and criteria by Congress.
41 Under § 201, an escape clause investigation by the ITC (originally the United States Tariff
Commission) will commence upon a request from the President, the Senate Committee on Finance,
the House Ways and Means Committee, the USTR, or upon an ITC motion or an application from
an interested party (industry, unions, or trade associations). 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a). In its escape
clause investigation, the ITC seeks "to determine whether an article is being imported into the
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tion of the changes in the remedy since 1951 demonstrates that, although
Congress repeatedly adjusted the procedures and criteria necessary for
relief, ultimate authority over tariff protection remained vested in the
President, and due to that control, the provision's enforcement has never
appreciably inhibited trade liberalization.
One major evolution of the escape clause provision was from a pro-
vision initially protecting against injuries from trade agreements and con-
cessions into one protecting against any kind of import injury.4 2 Another
interesting change over the years was the adjustment by Congress of the
degree to which increased imports actually contributed to the injury or
threat of injury to a domestic industry.43 A third example of adjustments
by Congress since 1951 are the statutory factors the ITC considers when
determining serious injury. In this case the adjustment was one of gen-
eral focus, not a heightening or lessening of degree.'
United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat
thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly competitive with the imported
article." 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1).
This statutory determination includes "all economic factors which [the ITC] considers rele-
vant," including: 1) the extent to which productive facilities are idled; 2) the extent to which sales of
the industry have declined; and 3) the extent to which an industry's market share has declined in the
presence of increase imports. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(A-C). After a public hearing by the ITC, a
decision on relief is rendered complete with recommended levels of relief. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(c-d).
After the report is delivered to the President, the President decides whether to give tariff relief or
deny relief because of harm to the national economic interest. 19 U.S.C. § 2252.
42 Compare Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1951, § 6 (aimed at increased imports due "as a
whole or in part" to trade concessions granted another country by the United States) with Trade Act
of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(aimed at injury arising from any kind of increased imports). The tran-
sition from specific aim to general protection actually came after Congress first demanded, in the
1962 law, a stricter causal connection between the increased imports and a trade concession of the
United States. See Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 301, 76 Stat. 872
(1962)(stipulating that increased imports must have resulted "in major part" from a concession not
just "due in whole or in part," as under the 1951 law). See supra note 43. There was no need to
show causal connection under the 1951 Act. See S. METZGER, supra note 31, at 44-45.
43 This criterion was also adjusted over time to provide United States industry greater protec-
tion. In 1962, injury due "as a whole or a part" to suspect imports-the 1951 criteria-was consid-
ered too permissive; instead, imports had to be "the main factor" in causing injury in order to justify
aid. Under the Trade Act of 1974, the criteria again eased. Increased imports had only to be "a
substantial cause" rather than "the major cause" of injury. Substantial cause was defined as one
"which is important and not less than any other cause." See S. METZGER, supra note 31, at 48-49.
44 Under the 1951 law, the United States Tariff Commission's mandate was to consider, inter
alia, "a downward trend of production, employment, prices, profits, or wages in the domestic indus-
try concerned, or a decline in sales, an increase in imports, either actual or relative to domestic
production, a higher or growing inventory, or a decline in the proportion of the domestic market
supplied by domestic producers." Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, § 7(b). In 1962, this
mandate to the Commission was modified to include "all economic factors which it considered rele-
vant, including idling of productive facilities, inability to operate at a level of reasonable profit, and
unemployment or underemployment." Trade Expansion Act, § 301(b)(2). These general factors
were modified again in 1974 and 1984, so that the ITC must currently consider "a decline in sales, a
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Despite congressional adjustment of the trade remedy's substantive
criteria throughout its thirty-odd year history, the basic relationship be-
tween the executive and the legislature in administering trade relief has
remained intact. Although sentiment has been expressed for a renewal of
a congressional role in aiding industries injured by imports through sim-
ple relief after proven injury, the trend has been for Congress to grant
more power to the executive branch.45 Congress has never taken from
the President its jurisdiction over final application of the escape clause.
In legislation aimed at affecting the decisionmaking criteria used by
the executive branch, Congress has maintained guidelines established in
the 1950s, a time when there was little interest and minimal pressure for
protectionism. Although a President whose aid decision ignored the
ITC's decision could have been overturned by Congress with increased
ease after 1951 and until INS v. Chadha,46 that power was never exer-
cised. The role Congress plays is simply that of an adjustor of criteria for
the ITC and other trade agencies in their adjudications and investiga-
tions. Once the hearings are complete and the law is codified, it is the
executive branch and not Congress which dictates whether an industry
receives effective aid.4 7 In short, institutionalization of the President-
with his or her national priorities-as the final enforcer of the escape
clause trade remedy assured that free trade policy could triumph even
where objective statutory criteria for protection were met.
higher and growing inventory ... and a downward trend in production, profits, wages, or employ-
ment .. . in the domestic industry concerned." Trade Act of 1974, as amended, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2251(b)(2)(B)(Supp. 11 1984).
45 As early as the 1962 hearings, the position expressed on import aid was that "relief ought not
to be denied for reasons that have nothing whatever to do with the merits of the case .... In
particular... no United States industry which has suffered serious injury should be cut off from
relief for foreign policy reasons." SENATE COMM. ON FINANcE, REPORT ON THE TRADE ACT OF
1974, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7263, 7268, quoted in Ris, supra note
33, at 307. Despite this rhetoric, the 1962 Act was the most anti-protectionist to come out of com-
mittee. During these hearings Congress expanded the executive branch's discretion with the inclu-
sion of adjustment assistance as an alternative to the escape clause, but did not establish enforceable
rules to dictate presidential choice. See generally Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 302.
46 462 U.S. 919 (1983). After Chadha, the Trade Act of 1974 was amended to require a joint
resolution of Congress, 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c), so that it is now much more difficult for Congress to
override the President's actions.
47 Since Congress never restructured the escape clause legislation to make ITC decisions binding
on the President, many of the statutory changes in the provision since the 1951 have been mitigated
by the presidential prerogative to reject the ITC recommendations. Data compiled on ITC determi-
nations and presidential action upon them illustrates that the legislation regulating escape clause
procedures has not become more protectionist over time, as congressional revision of the law would
suggest. See Goldstein, Institutions, supra note 21, at 170 (setting forth data compiled on § 201
petitions and relief from 1958 to 1981). Especially in the years in which the United States was
engaged in the Tokyo Round of multilateral negotiations, the President consistently kept the United
States market open by offering less aid than the ITC recommended. See id.
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B. The Defense Against Unfair Trade: Antidumping Law,
Countervailing Duties, and Section 301
The escape clause is only one mechanism open to industries needing
import protection. Other forms of aid are based on differing notions of
what constitutes a legitimate claim for protection. These laws, conceived
before the Great Depression, are reflective of a period when the ideas of
Frederick List and Alexander Hamilton dominated those of Adam Smith
and David Ricardo.4" It is in this period, from the end of the Civil War
to Smoot-Hawley, in which ideas of autarky led policymakers to see
gains from trade only in terms of export expansion.4 9 This period gave
rise to what are labeled here as "unfair" trade laws.5 °
The questions addressed by those debating the tariff in the mercan-
tile period was whether a tariff's primary purpose should be to raise reve-
nue or to protect national industry. In the liberal period the debate
turned on the tariff as a foreign policy instrument, and the escape clause
legislation was used to ease the transition into free trade. Since no single
dominant position on determining an optimal tariff emerged, the type of
tariff passed was a function of the capabilities of particular pressure
groups within and outside Congress.5 After 1934, agreement on one po-
sition on tariff policy (that is, liberalism), substantially transformed the
interest group process.
What was somewhat unusual in the United States move to free trade
is that liberalization occurred without the dismantling of pre-liberal
48 List and Hamilton argued for a mercantile foreign economic policy, as opposed to Smith's,
Ricardo's, and Mill's support for laissez-faire and the doctrine of comparative costs. Mercantilism is
a body of thought identified with the economic practices of the 17th and 18th centuries. Mercantil-
ists generally argued that the end of economic activity is increased wealth and increased political
power for the state. One author identifies mercantilism with "the belief that the economic welfare of
the state can only be secured by government regulation of a nationalist character." D. COLEMAN,
REVISIONS IN MERCANTILISM 1 (1969). For List's perspective, see F. LIST, THE NATIONALE SYS-
TEM DER POLITISCHEN OEKONOMIE (rev. ed. 1977)(1841); Hamilton, Report on the Subject of Man-
ufacturers, in 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 230 (1987); see also Viner, Power Versus
Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the 17th and 18th Centuries, 1 WORLD POL. 1 (1948). For
one of the first systematic criticisms of mercantilism, see A. SMITH, 4 THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(London 1775).
49 Although by 1913 liberal ideas had gained acceptance among a subset of policymakers, it was
only after 1934 that legal and institutional changes allowed these ideas to be translated into policy.
50 The genealogy of the modern forms of antidumping, countervailing duty, and the omnibus
§ 301 remedy, which go back to the mercantilist period of United States international economic
philosophy, is curious considering that the current object of these laws is the promotion of fair trade
among competitors. In fact, the layering of institutions and norms has simply transformed the origi-
nally protectionist institutions of the 1800s into the fair trade vehicles of today.
51 For an analysis of the pre-1934 tariffs, see D. LAKE, supra note 10; T. TERRILL, THE TARIFF,
POLITICS, AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1973); F. TAUSSIG, TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES (8th ed. 1931).
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norms, values, and institutions. Laws written in the country's pre-liberal
period reveal a far different set of state interests than would be the case
after the Depression. In design, these "mercantile" statutes reflect earlier
United States concerns with economic nationalism, not with later interest
in the international gains free trade would afford. These laws changed
little, even as the United States revamped its basic approach to trade
policy. Thus, in the United States most liberal period (and continuing
today) a mandate existed to exclude "unfair" imports through use of
trade laws rooted in the mercantile period of United States tariff history.
When analyzed together, some legal and philosophical differences
appear between cases considered under the free trade law (the escape
clause) and the unfair trade laws. Primarily, there is a distinct concept of
wrong present in violations of unfair trade laws which does not exist in
the escape clause action. Belief in the long-term benefits of the free mar-
ket leads United States decisionmakers to condemn foreign governments
and industries that attempt to interfere with the market mechanism, es-
pecially if the goal of that manipulation is deemed "predatory."
In addition, there is a problem in the discovery and definition of a
violation of the unfair trade laws. Aside from an apparent problem with
data collection on the production of foreign goods, there is the more
complex issue of which criteria should be used to assess policies of differ-
ent economic and social systems. Although states vary greatly in their
philosophical and historical relationships to domestic producers, the re-
lationship assumed as the norm under the unfair trade laws is that found
in the United States.52 To use the United States as a benchmark in these
laws, however, establishes criteria on the extreme end of a continuum.53
Related to this problem is the determination of intent. Foreign produ-
cers may engage in what the United States views as unfair practices with-
out predatory intent (that is, practices not aimed at gaining a market
advantage unfairly), but still receive the same treatment under the unfair
trade laws as purveyors of predatory policies. The result is often both an
international chafing at the use of these trade remedies and a mis-
characterization of United States trade policy.
L Antidumping Legislation
Antidumping law is aimed at protecting home producers from im-
52 See, eg., Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, in THE NEW CORPORATISM (F. Pike &
T. Stritch eds. 1974).
53 The enforcement of United States values on state-industry relationships, interferes with the
foreign policy goal of prosperity in non-communist states, translates into interference into other
states' domestic policies, alienates allies, and violates principles of sovereignty.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 8:328(1987)
ports sold at a value below that sold in their home market or below their
cost of production. Antidumping legislation first appeared in its modem
form in the United States in 1921,"4 although a parallel provision in the
Revenue Act of 1916 contained a similar condemnation of unfair trade
practices." Today, if a good is found to be sold in the United States at
less than its fair market value ("LTFV"), a duty equal to the difference
between actual price and fair price is assessed.16 The criteria for deter-
mining LTFV sales are more detailed than other trade remedies. 7 If a
LTFV ruling is made by the Commerce Department, the case is sent to
the ITC to determine whether there has been domestic "injury" as a re-
sult of the dumping activity. 8
Until 1979 the ITC had a wide amount of discretion in its injury
determination. 9 The discretionary nature of the injury determination
54 Anti-Dumping Act of May 27, 1921, ch. 14, 42 Stat. 11 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 160-71 (1982)).
55 Revenue Act of September 8, 1916, ch. 463, 9 Stat. 756 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 71-77, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1333, 1335 (1982)).
56 See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, tit. I § 101, 93 Stat. 144, 19 U.S.C.
1671 (1982).
57 Dumping is currently defined by 300 lines of statute and an additional 1000 lines of adminis-
trative regulation. See Finger, Hall & Nelson, The Political Economy of Administered Protection, 72
AM. EcoN. REV. 452, 453 (1982). By contrast, the only limit on the executive branch's escape
clause decisions is "the national economic interest of the United States," which is imposed on the
President's prerogative to refuse ITC relief recommendations. The criteria by which the ITC judges
injury under § 201 take up only 35 lines. Id.
58 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a)(1).
59 The character of the Tariff Commission (the predecessor of the ITC) proceedings was infor-
mal. Prior to 1974, no hearing was necessary, even if requested. Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14,
§ 201(a), 42 Stat. 11 (1921)(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 160(a)), repealed by Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-39, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 144, 193, replaced by Trade Agreements Act
§ 101, 93 Stat. 144, 150, adding tit. VII to Tariff Act of 1930 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1671-77g(1980)). See also U.S. Tariff Comm'n Rules on Practice & Procedure § 201.11, 27 Fed.
Reg. 12,119 (1962)("Public hearings are to be held by the Commission when required by law, or if
not required by law, when in the judgment of the Commission there is good and sufficient reason
therefore.").
Formal hearing procedures came about with the enactment of the Trade Act of 1974. "Before
making any determination under [§ 160(a)], the Secretary or the Commission... shall at the request
of any foreign manufacturer or exporter, or any domestic importer, of the foreign merchandise in
question, or of any domestic manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler of merchandise of the same class
or kind, conduct a hearing .... Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 321, 88 Stat. 1978, 2044
(1975)(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 160(d)).
The Commission was given broad discretion in the scope of its inquiry. 19 U.S.C.
§ 160(a)("after such investigation as [the Commission] deems necessary"). As a result, despite find-
ings by Treasury of foreign merchandise being sold at less than fair value ("LTFV"), the Commis-
sion's wide-ranging investigation may actually conclude that no injury had resulted and thus duties
were not required. See, e.g., Vital Wheat Gluten from Canada, 29 Fed. Reg. 5921 (1964)(upon
notification of sales in the United States at LTFV, a Canadian gluten producer reduced its price to
competitive levels, resulting in a determination of no injury by the Commission).
The factors the Tariff Commission considered in making its final determination did not neces-
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became a central concern to foreign producers by the time the Kennedy
Round of GAIT negotiations commenced in 1963. The GATT 1967
Antidumping Code resulting from the Kennedy Round attempted to es-
tablish uniform antidumping standards and procedures. In particular,
the 1967 Code outlined in greater detail the concept of injury. The Code
employed the "material injury" language of GATT Article VI, but added
the consideration of restrictive trade practices, and the extent to which
foreign prices undercut domestic prices in making an injury determina-
tion. The Code seemed to change the focus to predatory (rather than
competitive) intent and effects of trade practices.6  Congress never fully
enacted the injury definition of the 1967 GATT Code, however, because
it feared that the difference in degree of injury required between the Code
and the 1921 Act would make domestic law less effective as a defense
against predatory pricing by foreign producers.6
At the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations, which opened in Sep-
tember 1973, the call for uniform definition of the injury concept was
finally answered. The 1979 Antidumping Code adopted during the To-
kyo Round was implemented by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. The
new act raised the injury requirement from the de minimis standard of
the 1921 law to one of "material injury." 62
Additional changes made to United States antidumping law in 1979
pointed directly to the weaknesses in the executive branch's administra-
tion of antidumping law. New time limits were set for the assessment of
dumping duties. Before 1979, duties could be delayed for prolonged peri-
ods of time.63 The 1979 law put a stop to these practices by setting a one
sarily have to apply to the injury determination alone. The Commission could thwart a petition for
antidumping duties after a redetermination that the foreign producer was not, according to their
judgment, dumping, and thus overturn the Treasury Department. See Davis, The Regulation and
Control of Foreign Trade, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1442 (1966); Baier, Substantive Interpretations Under
the Antidumping Act and the Foreign Trade Policy of the United States, 17 STAN. L. REV. 418 (1965).
60 Lorenzen, Technical Analysis of the Antidumping Agreement and the Trade Agreements Act,
I 1 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1405, 1411, 1413 (1979). See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, June 30, 1967, art. 3, 19 U.S.T. 4349, T.I.A.S. No.
6431.
61 See Lorenzen, supra note 60, at 1413.
62 This was the requirement adopted by the 1979 Code and reflects a major concession by the
United States to its trading partners during the Tokyo Round. Lorenzen, supra note 60, at 1421.
Congress enacted the standard "material injury" into the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, and de-
fined it as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant." 19 U.S.C. § 1677.
While this standard is hardly clear, it appears to have raised the injury threshold from the de
minimis injury which existed before 1979. Lorenzen, supra note 60, at 1422; see also Lowenfeld, Fair
or Unfair Trade, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 205, 208 (1980). Section 612 of the Trade and Tariff Act of
1984 established new criteria for determining "threat" of material injury. 19 U.S.C.A.
§ 1677(7)(F)(1985).
63 Marks, Recent Changes in American Law on Regulatory Trade Measures, 2 WORLD ECON.
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year statutory time limit after the import transaction is completed for the
collection of antidumping duties.64
Another example of Congress's growing institutional awareness was
its shifting of the LTFV determination to the United States Department
of Commerce in the 1979 law. This transfer was based on arguments
that the Commerce Department, with its attachment to United States
industries, would be more responsive than the Treasury Department to
antidumping duty requests.65 Although the administrative organization
has changed, however, the legal mandate has not. Thus, the Commerce
Department, another executive branch agency, may also choose to use
the statutory latitude to maintain a liberal United States market.
2. Countervailing Duty Legislation
United States trade laws also provide aid to United States industry
in situations where a foreign nation is directly or indirectly bestowing a
subsidy to a domestic producer or exporter. This aid is in the form of a
countervailing duty, which ideally is set equal to the net amount of the
subsidy and is levied upon that product when it is imported into the
United States.66 The rationale behind countervailing duty law is that the
duty will offset any unfair competitive advantage attained by a foreign
manufacturer or producer due to a foreign government subsidy. In most
other countries, subsidized exports are not distinguished from sales be-
low cost.67
Current countervailing duty law requires that the Secretary of Com-
merce countervail when it is found after an investigation that a foreign
nation has extended a "bounty or grant" to goods imported into the
United States,68 and injury to a United States industry has occurred.69
In 1979, when the Tokyo Round Agreements resulted in the adoption of
427, 434 (1980)(delays of up to seven years were on record in collecting dumping duties, and uncol-
lected duties owed to United States industry in amounts up to $400 million were claimed).
64 Id.
65 See I. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS: SYSTEM UNDER STRESS 99 (1986); see also R.
BALDWIN, supra note 10, at 117-18 (stating that most members of Congress believed that the Com-
merce Department would follow the intent of Congress more closely than the Treasury Department
historically had).
66 For imports from members of GATT, the countervailing duty provisions, as amended by the
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, are codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1982 & Supp. III
1985); for nonmembers, these provisions are codified at § 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended
by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, and the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982
& Supp. III 1985).
67 Davis, supra note 59, at 1445.
68 For a survey of judicial interpretations of the term "bounty or grant," see J. BARTON & B.
FISHER, supra note 19, at 338-39.
69 See CURRENT PROVISIONS, supra note 1, at 47.
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a new international code on subsidies and countervailing duties, the
United States agreed to adopt a requirement of "material injury" and an
elaborate definition of subsidy for application to those countries which
were signatories to the Code. The old provisions remained in force for
those countries that did not sign the Subsidies Code. Non-Code coun-
tries may thus still be subject to countervailing duties merely upon the
demonstration that a subsidy is being provided, even if no injury to
United States industry is shown.7 °
The 1979 law promoted increased openness in adjudication proce-
dures, and the option of judicial review.7 1 The countervailing duty pro-
cedures were streamlined, with the timetable for resolution of cases now
seven months, where previously it was a year. A preliminary determina-
tion must be made within twenty days of the filing of a petition. Where a
positive preliminary determination is made, the foreign producer must
post a deposit within three months.
Until 1979, the Treasury Department (and subsequently the Com-
merce Department) had latitude to interpret the law, a flexibility which
undercut the protectionist potential of these statutes. While recent
changes were responsive to the interests of our trading partners in terms
of injury standard and procedural guidelines, they may have come too
late for United States industries. The reality of declining United States
competitiveness in many industries may have been better served by a bu-
reaucracy with greater latitude in the decision to countervail.
3. Section 301
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 ("§ 301"), as amended, gave
the President the authority to provide ailing United States businesses aid
that may not have been available under the injury requirements of the
antidumping or countervailing duty statutes. Section 301 authorizes the
President to "take all appropriate and feasible" action to "enforce the
rights of the United States under any trade agreement" or to respond to
70 See J. BARTON & B. FISHER, supra note 19, at 336-37; see also Marks, supra note 63.
71 Section 776(a) of the 1979 Act provides for verification and publication of "all information
relied upon in making a final determination in an investigation." Tariff Act of 1930, tit. VII,
§ 776(a), 93 Stat. 150, 186 (1979), added by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 101 (codified at 19
U.S.C. 1677e(a)(1980)). In addition, interested parties received access to information used in the
determinations, subject only to confidentiality considerations, and authorities must also provide pro-
gress reports and records of ex parte meetings. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f. Hearing transcripts must also be
provided. 19 U.S.C. § 1677c(b). Judicial review of the determinations was expanded by making
review available to "any interested party who was a party to the proceeding" and including more
types of decisions which could be challenged. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 1001 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(1980)). For a discussion of the expanded availability of judicial
review under the Trade Agreements of 1979, see Marks, supra note 63, at 437-40.
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any foreign practice that is "unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discrimina-
tory and burdens or restricts United States commerce."'7 2 The Presi-
dent's broad authority under § 301 enables him or her to attack unfair
barriers to trade in services, foreign non-tariff barriers, and foreign indus-
trial policies which have brought about a competitive advantage for for-
eign firms.73
Like the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, § 301 relief has
evolved to assist United States industries searching for a standby mecha-
nism to deal with specific trade problems.74 Historically, the remedy was
employed mostly to reach restrictive foreign practices affecting a broad
range of manufactured and agricultural goods.7 5 It was not until 1984
that the President's ability to take retaliatory action in the case of trade
in services was clearly articulated by statute.7 6
Presidential actions which § 301 permits (whether investigatory,
conciliatory, or retaliatory) may be taken either on the President's own
initiative or in response to a petition filed by a private party with the
USTR. Any § 301 petition must allege either substantive violations of
the provisions of a trade agreement; deny benefits to the United States
under a trade agreement; 77 or be unreasonable or discriminatory and a
72 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(a)(1982), as amended by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
573, § 304, 98 Stat. 2948.
73 The potential reach of § 301 is broader than the issues addressed here. For example, recent
petitions under § 301 have attacked trade restricting practices that: 1) denied market access for
United States exporters of footwear to Brazil, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan; 2) disrupted world rice
markets through subsidization (by Taiwan); 3) denied foreign business to United States air courier
service providers (by Argentina); 4) used domestic policies to subsidize exports and restrict imports
of soybean oil and meal (by Brazil, Argentina, Spain, Portugal, Malaysia and Canada); 5) subsidized
and diverted exports to the United States market of specialty steel (by Belgium, France, Italy, the
U.K., Austria, and Sweden); and 6) limited through the denial of tax deductions the placement of
advertising by Canadian businesses with United States border area broadcasters. See Bello &
Holmer, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Requirements, Procedures, and Developments, 7 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 633 (1986).
74 Industries unable to qualify for aid under the escape clause have turned repeatedly to unfair
trade statutes, even where their problems were not due to unfair trade practices. By filing petitions,
industries hope to gain administrative attention, politicize their plight and garner the more substan-
tial relief of a tariff or orderly marketing agreement. See Goldstein, Ideas, supra note 6.
75 The antecedent statutes to § 301 were the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794,
§ 252(c), 76 Stat. 872 (1962), and the Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 350(a)(5), 48 Stat. 943 (1934).
76 See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(A)(Supp. III 1984).
77 19 U.S.C. § 241 l(a)(1)(B)(i). While the USTR has generally interpreted "trade agreement" to
mean the GATT or any of the GATT codes negotiated during the Tokyo Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, see Bello & Holmer, supra note 73, at 635, there are many international accords
on which a § 301 petitioner might rely, such as Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties,
INTELSAT, and the OECD Guidelines on Investment Practices. See generally Fisher & Steinhardt,
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Protection for US. Exporters of Goods, Services and Capital, 14
L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 569 (1982).
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burden or restriction on United States commerce.78 Section 301, then,
provides parties with a cause of action under agreements constituting
positive international law, and when properly wielded, has the ability to
establish a common law of "fairness" in international markets.79
In those situations where no international agreement clearly applies
to the trade problem, the "unjustifiable," "unreasonable," and "discrimi-
natory" indicia come into play. "Unjustifiable" has been defined to in-
clude acts policies or practices which are "inconsistent" with-as
opposed to "contrary to"-international agreements."0 Arguably, this
definition covers foreign government action which is technically legal but
violates the spirit of an agreement, or which violates common under-
standings or practices that are not themselves the subject of international
agreements. While this definition indisputably includes: 1) denial of na-
tional or "most favored nation" (MFN) treatment; 2) denial of the right
to establish an enterprise in a foreign country; and 3) denial of protection
for intellectual property rights;" it also seems to extend to almost any
inequitable or bad faith practice.
"Unreasonable" has been similarly broadly defined to mean "any
act, policy, or practice which, although not inconsistent with interna-
tional legal rights of the United States is otherwise unfair or inequita-
ble."8 2 The definition includes both the denial of fair and equitable
market opportunities and opportunities to establish enterprises.8 3 Since
unreasonable acts need not be inconsistent with any international agree-
ment, this criterion allows for sweeping unilateral condemnations of for-
eign government practices.8 4 "Discriminatory" includes acts that
uniquely discriminate against United States business in favor of others.
It covers acts, policies, or practices which deny national or MFN treat-
ment to United States goods, services, or investment.8 5
Perhaps the most important feature of a § 301 action is the lack of a
statutory material injury requirement. More significantly, § 301 peti-
tions are required to move through fewer layers of bureaucracy than are
petitions filed pursuant to other unfair trade statutes. They are submit-
ted directly to the USTR and may subsequently be referred from there to
the assistant secretary-level Trade Policy Review Group and even to the
78 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(a)(1)(B)(i).
79 Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 77, at 577.
80 19 U.S.C. § 2411(e)(4).
81 Bello & Holmer, supra note 73, at 640.
82 19 U.S.C. § 2411(e)(3).
83 Id.
84 See Bello & Holmer, supra note 73, at 642.
85 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(e)(5).
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cabinet-level Economic Policy Council, rather than first going to the ITC
or the Department of Commerce. 86 The action that can be taken by the
President after a positive § 301 determination includes, but is not limited
to, suspension or withdrawal of concessions granted to the foreign coun-
try under trade agreements, or imposition of duties or other import re-
strictions on products from that country, for such period as deemed
appropriate.8 7
Section 301's potential relief for United States industries facing the
problem of closed foreign markets is significant. Japan and the newly
industrializing countries ("NICs") (e.g., Korea and Taiwan) have suc-
cessfully used closed domestic markets to build internationally competi-
tive industries engaging in massive export drives. Import problems
plaguing, for example, the United States automobile industry, would be
significantly fewer had that industry managed to gain entry into Japan's
closed markets.88
Another United States industry which has suffered the consequences
of exclusion from the Japanese market is the microchip producing indus-
try. These consequences are quite significant. First, exclusion means the
loss of the profit opportunities that finance research and development
necessary for the next generation of products. Exclusion also means
fewer opportunities to realize the economies of scale that bring down
costs and determine competitive position in world markets. Second, ex-
clusion keeps United States producers away from the scene of permanent
innovation and refinement in technology, particularly in the area of con-
sumer products and manufacturing techniques. The only way for United
States producers to stay abreast of technological change in Japan is to be
in the market. The success of Japanese industries as diverse as autos,
steel, and consumer electronics in world markets arose from the ability of
Japanese manufacturers to move rapidly to volume production with lim-
ited risk in a domestic market insulated from foreign competition.89
86 19 U.S.C. § 2412. See also Bello & Holmer, supra note 73, at 649-50. An interagency process
occurs during the early conduct of a § 301 proceeding. Initially, potential § 301 petitioners often
seek advice as to the merits of their arguments from the interagency § 301 Committee, a standing
committee chaired by the USTR and normally composed of representatives of the Departments of
State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice, Agriculture, and Labor, the Office of Management and Budget,
and the Council of Economic Advisers. Id. at 646. If the § 301 Committee does not agree on an
approach, the issue may then be taken to the Trade Policy Review Group. Failure to agree on an
approach there may result in the issue's consideration by the Economic Policy Council. Id. at 650
n.93.
87 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b). See also Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 77, at 635.
88 See generally L. Tyson & J. Zysman, Politics and Productivity: Developmental Strategy and
Production Innovation in Japan (Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy Working Pa-
per No. 30, Nov. 1987).
89 Id. See also Wolff, supra note 18, at 323; Tyson & Zysman, American Industry in Interna-
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As export sales or direct investment in Japan were denied to United
States producers during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the industries li-
censed their technologies to Japanese companies. Flush with new tech-
nology, Japanese companies refined their products and developed highly
efficient manufacturing systems, while simultaneously being protected
from the then superior products and productivity of foreign companies.
Assured financing in a protected home market led to the infamous over-
capacity and export drives now characteristic of the East Asian NICs.
United States pioneers of innovative technologies such as solid state tele-
vision and numerically controlled machine tools thus found themselves
out-produced in world markets. Their call for protection was the only
response provided by the United States trade regime.
Section 301 provides the only trade law tool able to force negotia-
tions on lowering foreign trade barriers against United States exports. In
a growing number of cases, § 301 petitions have been used to accomplish
exactly that.90 Even when no remedial action has been authorized by the
President, the threat of such action has sometimes served to secure com-
petitive access for United States products in foreign markets. 91
The use of § 301 has also been a critical remedy in cases where past
practices by a foreign government have created a current "comparative
advantage." Japan's recent and phenomenal success in international
markets in exporting high-tech products such as semiconductors, numer-
ically controlled machine tools, and telecommunications equipment, has
resulted in renewed focus on Japanese industrial policies by United States
businesses and government. In these more recent trade disputes, the
scrutiny has been on a Japanese industrial policy, known as "targeting,"
which involves intensified promotion of a specific industrial sector. By
targeting specific high technology sectors for development, the Japanese
have been able to undermine the relative position of competing United
States producers.92
tional Competition, in AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION: GOVERNMENT
POLICIES AND CORPORATE STRATEGIES 27, 30-31, 34-38 (L. Tyson & J. Zysman eds. 1983)[herein-
after AMERICAN INDUSTRY].
90 See Bello & Holmer, supra note 73, at 653-65 (illustrating the significance and variety of
§ 301's uses, particularly in those cases seeking improved access to foreign markets for United States
exports of goods and services and for direct investment).
91 See Fisher & Steinhardt, supra note 77, at 578 (describing how the astute use of a threat of
filing a § 301 complaint, with the accompanying threat of retaliation, adverse publicity, and the
souring of trade relations, can act as leverage to achieve a desired end-perhaps more effectively
than actually filing a complaint and pursuing it through administrative channels).
92 See, eg., SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION & VERNER, LIIPFERT, BERNHARD &
MCPHERSON, THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT TARGETING ON WORLD SEMICONDUCTOR COMPETI-
TION (1983). For a general discussion of the practice of targeting, its legality under the GATT, and
the adequacy of United States trade laws to offset or eliminate a foreign countrys targeting policy,
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Targeting93 is only one policy tool, however, which has helped cre-
ate a comparative advantage for Japan in several technology sectors.94
In fact, targeting should be viewed as part of a complex web of policy
instruments geared towards achieving comparative advantage. This web
includes industry rationalization, export cartels, tax incentives, user-di-
rected subsidies, learning centers, leasing arrangements to encourage
technology diffusion, and programs for lowering the costs of factor in-
puts to Japanese firms. Typically, these policies are directed at the com-
petitive development of critical sectors with links to other industries
which have the potential to affect the growth and development of the
entire economy.
Critical sectors, such as semiconductors and machine tools, are seen
as a type of industrial infrastructure (much as roads and bridges were
viewed in an earlier era) needed to sustain economic growth. So viewed,
the sector-by-sector development of such sectors is an appropriate goal of
government policy in a capitalist economy. The Japanese aim is not to
eliminate directly all competition from other nations' industrial sectors
(although that may be its ultimate effect). Rather, the aim is to trans-
form Japanese producers into low cost international competitors. In
short, Japan's use of targeting is aimed at capturing the domestic benefits
of comparative advantage by creating a domestic infrastructure which
delivers lowest cost competitiveness in international markets.
Japan's ongoing effort to create comparative advantage in certain
industries poses a formidable obstacle for any policy response attempted
under existing United States trade law. Once a United States petitioner
files a complaint, the United States trade bureaucracy must focus on the
foreign behavior which is a current and product-specific violation of one
or several of the United States trade statutes. However, the promotional
programs which created the Japanese comparative advantage may have
been terminated years before their effect was felt by United States indus-
try. The United States trade laws simply do not have the capacity to
defend against Japanese targeting measures whose success has already
been achieved in a more competitive Japanese industry. The existence of
see Note, Foreign Industrial Targeting: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a Remedy, 25 VA. J.
INT'L L. 483 (1985).
93 Targeting includes the establishment of industry-wide goals, producer subsidies, cooperative
research and development, and tight control over access to the domestic market in the "targeted"
sectors. See Note, supra note 92.
94 The argument on "created comparative advantage" is developed throughout AMERICAN IN-
DUSTRY, supra note 89, and in Zysman & Cohen, Double or Nothing: Open Trade and Competitive
Industry, 61 FOREIGN AFF. 1113 (1983). The basic argument is that government policies can gradu-
ally affect the cost, availability, and quality of factor inputs (human, capital, and resources), and
thus-over time-alter a nation's comparative advantage by improving its economic base.
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such a competitive advantage itself does not trigger a violation under
United States trade laws. If Japan is not "caught in the act" of creating
an advantage and successfully prosecuted under the appropriate trade
law, its subsequent commercial success may not give rise to actionable
claims in the United States.
Policies such as targeting are enigmas to United States trade law and
industrial practice. Although not originally conceived to be a respite
from deviations from a liberal trade regime's norms, § 301 has been used
by United States business and the Congress to try to alleviate the effects
of Japanese targeting. As in the case of semiconductors, however, even
positive rulings on § 301 petitions and government attention to policies
such as "targeting" may not alleviate the problems facing United States
business.
Another alternative open to the United States government for aiding
its domestic industries is direct assistance similar to that offered under
Japanese industrial policy. To date, however, adjustment policies in the
United States bear little resemblance to their Japanese counterpart. The
history of the adjustment assistance programs show, among other things,
that the normative constraints on United States policymakers foreclose
promotional programs such as targeting, which have the potential to stop
the drain on United States competitive advantage.
C. Trade Adjustment and the Move to More Coherent Policies
As with the other two tenets of United States commercial policy-
free and unfair trade statutes-the origins of the country's adjustment
policies trace to a cognitive model of the proper relationship between
state and society. In this case the model focuses on the state's role in
mitigating the social effects of economic fluctuations-simply stated, the
welfare function of the state. After the 1930s, such active state participa-
tion gained increased legitimacy. Exigencies of the capitalist economy
due to business cycles, technological advances, or capital migration (to
name but a few) were accepted as costs associated with being a govern-
ment in a capitalist economy. The role accepted by the government,
however, was only that of adjustment. By the 1950s, the idea of direct
state intervention into the economy, a position which had gained some
acceptance in the 1930s, was rejected.
At their heart, trade adjustment policies reflect post-New Deal polit-
ical norms. They are essentially compensatory. The state "pays off" in-
dustries and labor groups adversely affected by trade policy from a
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hopefully ever-expanding "pie." 95 Trade adjustment assistance ("TAA")
was buttressed by the notion that if trade policy was going to affect con-
stituents adversely, they were entitled to state aid. To understand TAA
only as a method of selling trade liberalization, however, is to fail to
appreciate the welfare function the program has played. Though not so
conceived in the early 1960s, adjustment assistance evolved into an im-
portant trade policy component of government reaction to a rising
number of industry petitions for protection.
TAA was first proposed in 1954 in a minority opinion to the report
of the Randall Commission.96 That proposal saw adjustment assistance
in the form of federal financial aid as a replacement for escape clause aid.
A weak version of TAA appeared in the 1962 Trade Act,97 was then used
in the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965,98 and was ultimately
expanded in the 1974 Trade Act and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1981.99
Under the 1962 Act, both individual workers and firms were eligible
for aid. 1"° Petitions were filed with the Tariff Commission for investiga-
95 See generally Metzger, supra note 31, at 55-57.
96 COMMISSION ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS
54-58 (1954). See G. HUFBAUER & H. ROSEN, TRADE POLICY FOR TROUBLED INDUSTRIES 33-34
(1986). Although formal legislation of trade adjustment assistance appears relatively late in the
liberalization period, the general notion of an adjustment wage was recommended much earlier. A
report commissioned by President Roosevelt in 1933 and written by the Social Science Research
Council suggests such compensation as part of the liberalization process. Their explanation was as
follows:
Since reductions [in tariffs] must, of necessity, be made... and since nearly all tariff reductions
are bound to meet with great opposition, the question arises whether it would not be well both
as a matter of justice and in the interest of practical politics to provide compensation in those
cases in which serious losses to both workers and investors can be clearly demonstrated. Such
cases might be looked upon as analogous to the condemnation of property. The government
when it condemns real property for a public purpose... always pays fair compensation. Would
not a similar procedure in the case of some downward revisions of tariffs be no less fair? With
the possibility of compensation no industry would have a strong case if it was thought necessary
in the public interest to liquidate that industry.... [Compensation to labor] is but a special
form of unemployment wage; it is therefore consistent with present trends in social legislation.
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 70-71 (1933). For
a general background on the history of the trade adjustment assistance ("TAA") program, see D.
MITCHELL, LABOR ISSUES OF AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT (1976); see
also R. BAUER, I. POOL & L. DEXTER, supra note 10, at 43.
97 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, tit. III, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872,
883 (1962).
98 Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, §§ 301-04, tit. III, Pub. L. No. 89-183, tit. III,
§ 301, 79 Stat. 1016-18 (1965).
99 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of Title 19, including 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2272-395 (1982 & Supp. II
1984)). For a more complete discussion of the current statutory framework, see CURRENT PROVI-
SIONS, supra note 1, at 67-68.
100 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 302(a)(2-3).
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tion of whether the alleged injury: 1) was due in major part to trade
concessions; 2) resulted in increased quantities of a like or directly com-
petitive product; and 3) whether such increase was a major factor in
causing or threatening to cause serious injury to the applicant firm, do-
mestic industry, or group of workers.1"' Since the criteria used in certify-
ing TAA cases to the President were identical under the 1962 law to
those for escape clause relief,102 a dilemma existed. The Tariff Commis-
sion "could not be liberal in approving adjustment assistance petitions
without being liberal in approving escape clause petitions. Thus, adjust-
ment assistance-which was supposed to foster freer trade-was in-
cluded in the Trade Expansion Act in such a way as to make its actual
use inconsistent with that objective." 10 3
In response to this dilemma, TAA was revamped under the Trade
Act of 1974.104 Under the 1974 law, once certified to receive adjustment
assistance, firms and communities received low cost loans and other fi-
nancial assistance and relief. Qualifying workers received a weekly ad-
justment allowance of 70%105 of their average weekly wage for a period
101 Id. § 301. After the petition for certification was approved by the appropriate member of the
executive branch (either the President, the Secretary of Commerce, or the Secretary of Labor, de-
pending upon the petitioner), the President could choose which form of relief to provide--either
escape clause tariffs or adjustment assistance. Id. § 302. After determining which type of aid was
appropriate, additional requirements had to be met before relief was actually awarded. See id
§§ 313-30.
102 Id.
103 D. MITCHELL, supra note 96, at 43. But see S. METZGER, supra note 31, at 59-61 (arguing
that the reason that adjustment assistance was included in the 1962 Act was to minimize tariff relief
as the remedy for domestic industries adversely affected by increased imports caused by trade agree-
ment concessions. Metzger argues that legislators were fully cognizant of the dichotomy between
adjustment assistance and escape clause criteria, but intended that the TAA criteria be applied less
stringently than those for escape clause relief.).
104 First, coverage was extended to communities as well as firms and workers. 19 U.S.C. § 2371
(1982). Second, the investigatory responsibilities and determination of injury were split between the
Labor Department for worker cases, 19 U.S.C. § 2273, and the Commerce Department for cases
involving firms and communities, 19 U.S.C. § 2251. Third, eligibility criteria changed from earlier,
stricter requirements to the following criteria: 1) a significant number of workers must be affected; 2)
there must be an absolute decrease in sales and production; and 3) imports of a like or directly
competitive article must have contributed importantly to a decline in sales or production. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2272. "Contributed importantly" was interpreted as "a cause which is important but not necessar-
ily more important than any other cause." Id.
This last criterion, whereby imports had to be of a like or directly competitive nature to a
product made in the United States, served to disqualify a number of otherwise qualified applicants,
especially in cases involving auto production. For example, a manufacturer of injection-molded
plastic parts (largely bumper fillers) used in domestic automobiles claimed that foreign car imports
in the late 1970s had hurt sales. Since similar parts were not being imported separately, but were
included as part of the assembled automobiles, the domestic bumper manufacturers did not qualify
for TAA. Holloway v. Donovan, 585 F. Supp. 1427 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
105 19 U.S.C. § 2292(a)(1). In no case was aid to exceed the average weekly manufacturing wage,
however.
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of up to fifty-two weeks."0 6 Workers in training, or workers over age
sixty, could qualify for an additional twenty-six week extension. 107
Although employment services and relocation allowances were offered to
facilitate reemployment, these measures constituted a small part of the
program.
The 1974 adjustment assistance program was extended in 1981 for
an additional two years and then modified by the Budget Reconciliation
Act after the Reagan administration announced the replacement of the
program.018 After this modification and until the present, aid is given as
an extension of unemployment insurance.'0 9
In essence, TAA was a program of transfer payments or redistribu-
tion offsetting the cost of trade liberalism. In this way, TAA acted as
both a welfare policy and a way to diffuse potential opposition to liberal
trade policies. " 0 While it was the latter which propelled its creation, the
former was its engine for growth."' Regardless of which factor is now
more important, adjustment assistance (or a functional equivalent) is a
necessary ingredient in a liberal United States trade policy. Where an
unregulated market leads to visible economic upheaval, the cognitive ba-
sis of liberalism will be questioned-the legitimacy of the free trade norm
will be cast into doubt. Therefore, some agency must play the critical
role of "buying off" potential opposition to state policy in order to pro-
tect the liberal norms of United States trade policy.
Although congressional efforts led to reauthorizations of TAA in
1983 and in 1986, reductions in the level and duration of benefits and a
substantial decline in the total budget have been hallmarks of the Reagan
presidency." 2 The idea of adjustment, however, emerged in early 1987
in a number of administrative reports. For fiscal year 1988, the Presi-
106 19 U.S.C. § 2293(a).
107 19 U.S.C. § 2293(a). In no case was aid to exceed 65% (70% in the 1974 Act) of the average
weekly manufacturing wage.
1o8 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2292, 2293.
109 19 U.S.C. §§ 2292(c), 2293(a)(1980 & Supp. 11 1984).
110 See generally S. METZGER, supra note 31, at 55-58; G. HUFBAER & H. ROSEN, supra note 96,
at 33-34.
111 The aggregate data for TAA shows large increases in aid requests since its creation. Requests
increased from under 20 a year while the program was administered by the ITC to over 1000 a year
under the 1974 Act and over 2000 a year between 1979 and 1982. TAA numbers dwarf the number
of requests for the escape clause, although these two laws served the same constituency. The number
of petitions resulting in aid is also much greater than with the escape clause. As opposed to other aid
programs, a majority of those who applied for aid did receive aid. Goldstein, Institutions, supra note
21, at 170, 173-74.
112 The recent and propitious decline in worker aid receipts was not unexpected. The Reagan
administration is committed to a reduced role for government and thus considers the premises of an
adjustment program-economic redistribution of the benefits of liberal trade-illegitimate.
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dent's budget recommendations included $980 million for job search,
counseling, and training for dislocated workers.11 3 Thus, for the mo-
ment, adjustment assistance appears secure as a redistributive trade pol-
icy which eases the pain of international competition, while failing to
cure the competitive challenge.
IV. THE MICROELECTRONIC DILEMMA
United States firms are being beaten in international semiconductor
competition.'" 4 Since the late 1970s, the dominant world market share
enjoyed by the United States producers of semiconductor components
was steadily eroded-and finally overtaken-by Japanese competition.
The world market share of United States semiconductor firms fell from
about 60% in 1978 to about 43% in late 1986.115 During the same time
frame, the share of the merchant world market held by Japanese produ-
cers has risen from about 24% to 46%.116 Japanese gains have clearly
come at the expense of the United States semiconductor industry. The
country's merchant firms have been unable to reverse Japanese gains, de-
spite an intensified focus on the traditional strengths and strategies that
forged their leadership position-entrepreneurial strategies aimed at
technological product innovation and market development strengths. By
contrast, Japanese firms enjoy the security of the largest and most insu-
lated national market for microelectronics. Japanese semiconductor pro-
ducers are backed by state policy and massive structural resources,
113 See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOV'T, 5-99, 5-100 (Supp. 1987).
114 Adapted from M. BORRUS, COMPETING FOR CONTROL: AMERICA'S STAKE IN MICROELEC-
TRONICS chs. I & 7 (forthcoming 1988).
115 Data drawn from the WORLD SEMICONDUCTOR TRADE STATISTICS PROGRAM (1987)[herein-
after STATISTICS PROGRAM].
116 Id. These figures are somewhat misleading because captive Japanese production-demand for
chips by major Japanese producers of semiconductor producers, mostly major Japanese electronics
companies-is included in the Japanese industry's "merchant" market share. M. BORRUS, supra
note 114, at ch. 2, notes that some 20% to 25% of total Japanese production is consumed internally,
a figure that has been relatively constant over the last decade.
Eliminating this Japanese captive production from overall figures would improve the merchant
United States share, but market share trends would still remain unchanged. Similarly, if captive
United States production (particularly that of IBM, AT&T, GM Delco, Digital Equipment, and
Hewlett Packard) is included in world market share figures, the United States share improves, but
there is no substantive change in overall market share trends.
The Defense Science Board estimates that, including United States captive production, the
United States world market share has fallen over the last decade from 67% to 50%, and the Japa-
nese share has risen from under 25% to 39%. U.S DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE DEFENSE
SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON DEFENSE SEMICONDUCTOR DEPENDENCY (Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Feb. 1987)(figures based on data from STATISTICS PROGRAM,
supra note 115, and information from Dataquest and Integrated Circuit Engineering Corporation).
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including investment capital loaned from government-affiliated banks at
low cost. This infrastructure has allowed Japanese firms to seize the
competitive initiative from their United States rivals.1 17
Japanese dominance in commodity memory, particularly in random
access memory chips ("RAMs"), 118 places severe competitive pressure
on United States merchant producers for two closely related reasons.
First, commodity memory devices such as RAMs have historically gen-
erated operating margins which have allowed United States merchant
firms to reinvest and to attract additional capital for research, develop-
ment, and ultimately growth. Second, and equally important, successive
generations of RAMs have been the simplest of increasingly complex in-
tegrated circuits. Experience gained in their production provides United
States merchant firms with the fabrication process know-how necessary
to become competitive in the manufacture of more complex devices.119
Japanese leadership in commodity memory therefore poses a double di-
lemma for United States firms: their margins and capacity to innovate
are squeezed at the same time that their ability to acquire critical process
know-how for future developments is threatened. United States produ-
cers simultaneously face rapidly rising research and development costs
and insufficient demand from which to generate the capacity necessary to
remain at the industry's leading edge. By the mid-1980s, it appeared that
losses in market position and technical leadership suffered by United
States producers would result in the demise of United States
competitiveness.
Recognizing that diversity and swift market responsiveness were in-
sufficient to reverse Japanese gains, major United States merchant
microchip producers turned to a political adjustment strategy. Perhaps,
they thought, trade law and policy could accomplish what business strat-
egies alone could not. In 1985 and 1986, major merchant United States
chip producers called attention to their plight by initiating several major
actions under various United States trade laws while attempting to gar-
ner congressional aid.' 2 ° These actions were propitious in timing, be-
cause they coincided with mounting congressional and administration
concern over the ever-larger United States trade deficit with Japan.
Through clever lobbying and by "wrapping itself in the American flag,"
117 See Note, supra note 92, at 487-88.
118 "RAMs" store digital information temporarily and can be changed by a user. A RAM consti-
tutes one basic storage element in a computer. See Borrus, Millstein & Zysman, Trade and Develop-
ment in the Semiconductor Industry: Japanese Challenge and American Response, in AMERICAN
INDUSTRY, supra note 89, at 247.
119 See id. at 222-23, 234-36.
120 See infra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
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the semiconductor industry succeeded in identifying its troubles with the
more widespread general discontent over Japanese trade tactics.
The industry's political-legal efforts actually began several years ear-
lier when it released a series of reports demonstrating that the Japanese
government had "targeted" the United States chip industry so as to gain
a competitive advantage for the Japanese industry."'2 The United States
industry argued that Japan was denying United States firms fair and
open opportunities to compete in the domestic Japanese market, while
Japanese firms were engaging in massive unfair trade practices in the
United States market. Alleging that Japanese producers were dumping
chips into the United States market, United States producers proclaimed
that they were being driven out of business. 122
By defining and documenting these two problems-market access
and dumping-the Semiconductor Industry Association ("SIA") had
crafted a base on which to build much needed political support. The
problems were discussed during the ongoing United States-Japan negoti-
ations of the High Tech Working Group, which was formed in 1984.
Despite assurances from the Japanese government, the access and dump-
ing problems remained unresolved. The United States government
seemed disposed to do little, given the Reagan administration's rhetorical
commitment to free trade and the still nascent political clout of the chip
makers.
Then, with trade deficits mounting despite a falling dollar in 1985
and 1986, the chip makers launched an increasingly sophisticated cam-
paign for trade relief. The SIA filed a trade petition under § 301 ,123
asking the United States government to negotiate increased access to the
Japanese market. The petition requested trade restrictions on Japanese
imports in the event that market access was not forthcoming. A small
United States memory producer, Micron Technologies, filed a claim
under United States antidumping laws that Japanese producers were
dumping 64 kilobyte dynamic random access memory chips ("64K
DRAMs") in the United States at prices less than fair market value. 12 4
121 See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
122 See generally Comment, International Trade: Japanese Dumping of Semiconductors, 27
HARV. INT'L L.J. 753 (1986).
123 Initiation of Investigation Under Section 301; Semiconductor Industry Association, 50 Fed.
Reg. 28,866 (1985). See Bello & Holmer, supra note 73, at 656-57.
124 64K Dynamic Random Access Memory Components from Japan, 51 Fed. Reg. 21781 (1986).
This petition was filed with the Department of Commerce and the ITC in June 1985. Both agencies
made positive antidumping findings. One Japanese importer, who was subject to the Antidumping
Duty Order issued by the Commerce Department, sued for and was granted a preliminary injunction
against liquidation of certain entries of semiconductors which were subject to the order. Oki Electric
Industry Co. v. United States, 669 F. Supp. 480 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
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The company also sued Japanese firms under United States antitrust law,
alleging a conspiracy to monopolize the United States memory mar-
ket.'25 In addition, another group of United States chip producers filed
an antidumping complaint against Japanese producers of erasable
programmable read only memory chips ("EPROMs"), asking for an em-
bargo on Japanese imports.126 Texas Instruments sued twenty-one East
Asian semiconductor producers (nineteen of which had Hong Kong of-
fices), alleging infringement of various Texas Instruments patents on
semiconductor memory.127
Not wishing to appear unresponsive in the face of such concerted
action, the Reagan administration initiated a dumping claim on behalf of
United States firms threatened by aggressive Japanese pricing tactics in
the 256K DRAM market.128 Simultaneous sets of congressional hear-
ings on the semiconductor trade issues and intensive lobbying completed
the well-orchestrated campaign.
Like the textile, steel, consumer electronics, and automobile indus-
tries before it, the United States microchip industry used a political-legal
campaign to provoke a trade policy response. Preliminary findings in the
antidumping cases upheld the United States industry's claims that Japa-
nese firms were dumping, while the § 301 petitions wound their way
through the administrative procedures.129 As increasingly negative eval-
uations of their chances to win on the merits filtered back to Japan, Japa-
nese firms and the Japanese government were finally forced to the
bargaining table in mid-1986.' 30 The microchip producers' well-orches-
trated relief campaign also began to constrain United States administra-
tive decisionmaking, though the Reagan administration sought a solution
to the semiconductor trade issues which would minimize damage to alli-
125 See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENT PROGRAM, 37TH
REPORT 1985 at 169-70 (1986).
126 Eraseable [sic] Programmable Read Only Memories (EPROMs) from Japan: Initiation of An-
tidumping Duty Investigation, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,450 (1985).
127 Certain Portable Electronic Calculators; Investigation, 49 Fed. Reg. 29,162 (1984). For sub-
sequent litigation, see Texas Instruments v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
128 Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of 256 Kilobits and Above From Japan;
Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigation, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,450 (1985); Dynamic Random Ac-
cess Memory Semiconductors of 256 Kilobits and Above From Japan; Antidumping Investigation,
50 Fed. Reg. 51,613-14 (1985).
129 Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of 256 Kilobits and Above from Japan,
USITC Pub. No. 1803, Inv. No. 731-TA-300 (Preliminary)(1986); 64K Dynamic Random Access
Memory Components from Japan, USITC Pub. No. 1735, Inv. No. 731-TA-270 (Preliminary)
(1982); Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories from Japan, USITC Pub. No. 1778, Inv. No.
731-TA-288 (Preliminary)(1985).
130 See Matsushita, supra note 36, at 53.




Following several false starts and the threat of a recommendation
for strong trade sanctions from the § 301 petition, the United States-Ja-
pan Semiconductor Trade Agreement ("Agreement") was announced on
July 31, 1986.132 The Agreement, running through 1991, addressed both
the dumping and market access issues. 133 On the dumping side, the
Agreement established minimum reference prices based on Japanese pro-
duction costs for RAMs, EPROMs, and several other categories of chips
for which United States firms still retained substantial market positions.
The minimum prices established were actually a moving price floor, and
have been repeatedly adjusted downwards as Japanese production costs
have fallen below prices at which dumping would be presumed.
An important term of the Agreement prohibits dumping not only in
the United States market, but in the Japanese and third country markets
for Japanese semiconductors as well.134 This provision appears to be
necessary (although virtually impossible to enforce) because most major
microchip buyers have worldwide purchasing operations. The an-
tidumping provisions would at least permit United States firms to stay in
the process development game via a continuing presence in EPROMs
and other "process driving" products, while stabilizing prices sufficiently
to allow a future return to profitability. There was also hope that price
stability would invite United States producers to re-enter the RAM pro-
duction market, although that hope had not materialized as of late 1987.
Unfortunately, the actual effect of the Agreement was to provide a profit
windfall to Japanese producers by stabilizing the disastrous price erosion
in RAMs after most United States firms had left the RAM market. Sta-
bilized prices also invited competition from Korean RAM producers.
On the market access issue, the Agreement formally acknowledged
that there was a problem which the Japanese government would try to
solve. However, United States producers did not receive from Japan an
explicit domestic market share target, though they understood the
Agreement to call for an approximate doubling of the existing United
131 See D. Yoffee & J. Coleman, The Semiconductor Industry Association and the Trade Dispute
with Japan (1987)(unpublished manuscript, Harvard Business School).
132 Statement by the President, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1021 (July 31, 1986).
133 See Memorandum from the President for the United States Trade Representative on the Sub-
ject of the U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Trade Agreement 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1020-22
(Aug. 4, 1986); see also Bello & Holmer, supra note 73, at 656-57.
134 Arrangement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of
America Concerning Trade in Semiconductor Products, reprinted in 25 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1409 (1986)[hereinafter Arrangement]; see also Determination Under Section 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,811 (1986).
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States market share by 1991.135
After these years of petitioning and deliberations, the semiconductor
industry continued to face "unfair" competition abroad. The United
States share of the Japanese market is now lower than the market share
held at the time of SIA's June 1985 § 301 petition.1 36 Furthermore, the
Agreement did little to control Japanese dumping in third country mar-
kets. 13 7 In the spring of 1987 the United States government finally took
retaliatory action against Japan for noncompliance with the Agreement.
Tariffs were placed on about $300 million worth of Japanese imports.1 38
However, the level of these tariffs was regarded by all parties, both for-
eign and domestic, as being far too low to be effective. Market access in
Japan continues to be a problem.
139
V. CONCLUSION
United States trade institutions are in a state of flux. Organized in-
dustrial and labor groups are demanding protection from both fair and
unfair international competition. Neither Congress, the trade bureau-
cracy, or the President can ignore this growing outcry against foreign
products and practices. Granting protection, however, portends an even
greater risk. The United States economy is increasingly dependent upon
foreign demand to spur its economic growth. Protectionism may lead to
135 In private interviews with Mr. Borrus, the Japanese side vehemently denied that any such
numerical target existed, though a secret codicil to the Agreement requiring the Japanese govern-
ment to increase United States market share-reportedly setting a goal of 20% of the market for
United States manufacturers within five years-is widely rumored to exist. See, ag., Comment,
Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America
Concerning Trade in Semiconductor Products, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 175, 178 n. 16 (1987)(citations to
several reports of the rumored codicil). Though the Agreement does not articulate the ways in
which United States companies will increase their share in Japan, the Japanese government agreed to
establish a promotional organization to facilitate long-term relationships. See Arrangement, supra
note 134.
136 Market share was about 9.4% in 1985 (preceding the Agreement), declined to 8.5% in July
1986, and increased about .5% the following year. SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, ONE
YEAR OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE U.S.-JAPANESE SEMICONDUCTOR AGREEMENT, FIRST ANNUAL
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, Executive Summary at 2 (1987).
137 Id. at 2, 7.
138 Id., The Settlement and the Suspension Agreements, at 1.
139 See id., Executive Summary, at 3; see also Letter from Irwin Federman, Chairman, Semicon-
ductor Industry Association, to President Ronald Reagan 2 (Nov. 3, 1987)(recommending that part
of the sanctions imposed for noncompliance with the Agreement be suspended by an amount corre-
sponding to the level of reduction in dumping of DRAMs and EPROMs found by of the Depart-
ment of Commerce. SIA emphasized, however, that the sanctions relating to market access must
remain in place because access to the Japanese market for imports from all sources showed no im-
provement. The SIA reluctantly concluded that imposition of additional sanctions may need to be
considered, even though this would probably negate the "extraordinary efforts of both countries to
reduce the level of hostility over trade issues.").
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reciprocal closure, which would cause the United States economy to suf-
fer far more in the future than it has in the past at the hands of foreign
competition.
Although the United States is faced with increasing pressures at
home and abroad, its response has been limited. Rather than attempting
innovative solutions to the problems of international competition, United
States trade institutions have been rigid in their response to import pres-
sures. This is not to argue support for their causes. Rather, it is to say
that government policy, even when responsive to industries (as in the
semiconductor case) has had and can have only marginal impact on the
behavior of foreign producers. Industries with sufficient clout are able to
elicit a response from the United States government, since a well-fi-
nanced and organized lobby cannot be ignored. Such response, however,
is ad hoc, and less effective than it should be.
Government attention and support, however, do not assure a solu-
tion to the problems faced by United States industries. Decisionmakers
are constrained by norms and institutions which limit the usefulness of
their policies. Industries may gain market shares after the government
responds to their requests for aid, but such gains are more often due to
the exigencies of the international market than to United States policy
itself.
Will these norms and institutions change? Perhaps, but if there is
change in the next decade, there will be only incremental movement
away from the liberal trade position currently advocated by the Reagan
administration, since neither of the necessary factors for deep normative
and institutional change exists.
First, change must be prefaced by the development of a theoretical
alternative to liberal trade. Despite the criticism leveled against foreign
nations that "cheat" and the disruptive impact of foreign trade on do-
mestic labor, the only theoretical alternative to liberalism remains pro-
tectionism. But protectionism of the pre-Depression sort has almost no
support among elected leaders. The fear of a "slippery slope," down
which tariffs lead to reciprocal closure of markets, dwindling trade, and
economic decline, is still a prevalent fear among policymakers.
With no politically viable alternative to liberalism, those dis-
enchanted with the trade regime are forced to focus attention on princi-
ples of "fair" trade, an idea which has near-unanimous support among
policymakers. While few policymakers today accept the idea that the
trade regime should discriminate against United States producers, how-
ever, this idea underlies the trade regime established after World War II.
Among a range of goods, including agricultural products, the United
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States trading partners were allowed to favor their own products over
United States goods. More general foreign policy concerns forced the
United States to tolerate closer relationships between foreign producers
and their governments than were sanctioned at home. In the 1950s and
1960s these "prejudicial" government-producer relationships did not en-
danger the United States economy, and formed, in fact, the infrastruc-
ture of the post-war alliance. By the 1970s, however, foreign penetration
of the United States market was deep enough to provide an unfair advan-
tage to European and Japanese producers. The underlying demand of
fair trade proponents is the unraveling of these government support sys-
tems on which the post-war alliance was based. This demand is one
which cannot be met.
If the first indicator of change in trade policy will be the develop-
ment of an ideological alternative to free trade, the second will be a
change in institutional structures. Today, the institutional arrangements
that allowed the liberalization of trade to occur remain intact. Congress,
though under pressure, has not re-asserted itself as the central agent of
trade policy. Congress has reacted to a range of protectionist issues, and
has enlarged the powers of executive agencies such as the ITC and the
USTR, but has not directly enacted protectionist legislation. Thus, be-
cause the basic institutional structures created in the 1930s and 1940s to
deal with outmoded ideas of pre-war protectionism are still standing, the
institutional response to complaints for aid in the 1980s will come from
institutions geared to react to the problems of prior decades. United
States industry, therefore, should expect little institutional relief from
trade pressures. And unlike its Japanese counterpart, United States in-
dustry does not have a champion in its government.
